Proponents of the so-called New Economy claim that it entails a structural change of the economy. Such a change, in turn, would require the centra1 bank to rethink its monetary policy to the extent that traditional relationships between inflation and economie g-rowth are no longer valid. But such a rethinking presupposes that prospective advances in information technology and other factors associated with the new economy do not threaten the capacity of centra1 banks to stabilise the genera1 leve1 of prices. It is the aim of this paper to shed some light on the latter, by analysing the monetary transmission mechanism in a 'new economy' environment. We argue that, although the form of central bank insn-uments and current methods for implementing monetary policy may change, the goals that the policy makers try to achieve by employing these instruments remain valid, and achievable.
Introduction
Within the euro area, electronic money currently is relatively intensely used in the Netherlands. The advent of software-based electronic money instruments has spurred research (see, among others, Boeschoten and Hebbink, 1996; Visser, 1996; Groeneveld and Visser, 1997) investigating the monetary policy implications of these technological innovations on the retail side of the payments system. This research points to a gradual substitution of currency by its electronic counterpart (currently mostly multi-purpose prepaid cards). As currency by itself is neither a useful operational or intermediate target nor a relevant Channel of transmission of monetary policy, this type of financial innovation is unlikely to inhibit, in any substantial way, the formulation of monetary policy (Henckel et al., 1999) . Indeed, recent work by the European Central Bank (ECB, 2000b) seems to take the same position.
However, innovations influencing the wholesale side of the payments system, both in gross and in net clearing systems, suggest the possibility of a less benign outlook for the monetary policy maker. The main reason for this is that these innovations affect the demand for reserves by financial intermediaries, which is at the core of the monetary transmission mechanism in modem economies.
This manifestation of the development of e-money may diminish the need for bank reserves at the central bank. It thus has (in the absente of regulatory measures) the potential of eliminating the monopoly position of centra1 banks as suppliers of the means of payment (Woodford, 2000) , with negative consequences for the ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy.
The evolution of electronic means of payment is but one of the manifestations of 'New Economy'-type of developments directly impacting on the centra1 bank and monetary policy in particular. Advances in information technology also influence the structure of (financial) markets, the (financial) behaviour of economie agents and the types of (financial) products traded; that is the entire Eichengreen and Irwin (1999) . We view the new economy as a dynamic process which results from an interaction * of al1 these factors, the end result of which could be that the speed limits of the economy are raised. We are interested in analysing the consequences of this process for the monetary transmission mechanism. It is to a description of the latter to which we now turn.
Monetarv transmission mechanism
The monetary transmission mechanism consists of several channels, al1 of them interlinked and each of them comprising of several stages, see Berk (2001) . Centra1 to these different views are altemative conceptions regarding important structural and institutional factors, more specifically the functioning of credit, labour and product markets. As wil1 be discussed in detail below, the above-mentioned factors associated with the new economy wil1 impact on the channels of the monetary transmission mechanism by affecting the functioning of markets. We should note at the outset, however, that no attempt is made to rank (the strength of the) different transmission channels, as our primary focus wil1 be on analysing the impact of the new economy on each Channel.
To illustrate the working of the monetary transmission mechanism and the role of these factors it is useful, for presentational purposes, to highlight the following elements.3 First, the influence of changes in the instrument variables on the tost of finance. Second, the influence of changes in the tost of finance on expenditure decisions of private-sector agents, i.e. on non-financial activity. The latter is defined to include inflation and real economie activity. Third, the pass-through of changes in non-financial activity to output and inflation. Underlying this division of the transmission mechanism into separate stages is the conception that markets do not necessarily clear instantaneously. If, on the other hand, al1 markets did always clear, the transmission mechanism would be fairly trivial. A change in the instrument variable would immediately lead to a compensating change in the price level, without having consequences for output. The classica1 dichotomy would be maintained.4 This is not to say that the new economy could not, by increasing the availability of information and reducing transaction costs, be interpreted as a move towards the textbook model of perfect competition (McTeer, 2000) . As wil1 be further discussed in section 6 below, it could be argued that, if one were to extrapolate the factors mentioned in the previous section ad injìnitum, the result would closely resemble the perfect competition paradigm. However, while conceivable enough from a theoretical point of view, the prospects for this paradigm of coming 1960's. Kahn and Wiener (1967) discussed the emergence of a new economy in the context of the spread of ICT. ' For example, information technology, financial innovation and globalisation are intimately hnked. By reducing the tost of communications. ICT has helped to globalise product and capita1 markets. In turn, globalisation spurs competition and therefore innovation, and speeds up the diffusion of new technology through trade and investment. For details on the various interactions, see, for example, Buiter (2000) and Sijben (2000) .
into reality in the foreseeable future can be put into question. The main part of our analysis wil1 therefore be devoted to an investigation not of the end result of the new economy, but on the process towards it and of the most likely implications for the various transmission channels of monetary policy.
The influence of changes in the instrument variable on the tost of finance
The presumption underlying this stage is that there exists a mechanism that links the purely financial operations of the centra1 bank to the non-financial decisions made by economie agents. More specifically, it is assumed that the monetary authority exercises power over economie behaviour of private-sector agents by influencing the financial (opportunity) tost relevant to the spending decisions of these agents. The typical operational target used by centra1 banks is the ovemight rate, which it broadly determines through its monopoly control, notably by open market operations, of the monetary base, ie the currency outstanding and the deposits held with centra1 banks by commercial banks (Crockett, 1994; Mishkin, 1996) . According to BIS (1994) , the pass-through from these ovemight rates to short-term market interest rates is fairly complete in most industrialised countries. The centra1 bank therefore is able to control the short-term market interest rate. Although this position is currently relatively unchallenged (see also Bemanke and Blinder, 1992; Mauskopf, 1990) , the question arises how the new economy impacts on this centra1 bank control of the ovemight rate. Put differently, what are the consequences of the new economy for the influence the centra1 bank currently has on the monetary base. Moreover, if that influence would disappear, is the centra1 bank stil1 able to control short-term interest rates? We wil1 discuss these issues in turn.
Centra1 bank injluence on the monetary base
The most visible advance in KT with a possible impact on (the relevante of) central bank influence on the monetary base pertains to the development of convenient ways of executing payments electronically that might in the past have required the use of centra1 bank issued currency. These electronic innovations often have been loosely labelled by the term electronic money. or e-money. Although the medium-ofexchange function probably is the most important in a discussion of electronic currency substitutes (Ely, 1997; England, 1997; Berentsen. 1998; ECB, 2OOOb) , it is important for what fellows to note that money performs more roles than facilitating transactions. Indeed, defining the concept of money is by no means an easy task (see Dalziel. 2000 , for a comprehensive survey and Bengtsson, 2OOOa. 2000b for a theoretical analysis). and the same holds for its electronic variant. Standard economie textbooks attribute to it three characteristic functions: medium of exchange, a store of value and unit of account. The legal defïnition of electronic money as currently prevailing in Europe for instance reflects most of these functions.5 ' According to article 1 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/46/EC, 'electronic money shall mean monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is (i) stored on an electronic device: (ii) issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued. (iii) accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the user'.
It is convenient for what follows to distinguish between three classes of electronic means of payment, ie e-transfers, e-purses and e-money proper (White, 1997; Lelieveldt et al., 2000) . E-transfers are defïned as transfers which are not based on paper as a source document (an example of the lattter would be checks). A subset of e-transfers is e-purses, the most prominent example of which are multipurpose stored value cards or smart cards which fïgure prominently in European countries and Japan.6
Value transferred from payer to payee via e-purses can not, in general, be used again, but has to be forwarded to the issuer for redemption. E-purses that allow for the direct transfer of credit balances from purse to purse, without the immediate involvement of the issuing (financial) institution, fa11 into the category of e-money proper.
While al1 of these concepts initiate an electronic transfer of value between two transaction accounts, only balances of e-money proper are circulating bearer media. When issued by private parties, they can be considered to fullfill a full-fledged medium of exchange role which has the potential to evolve to a substitute for centra1 bank currency.' A balance of e-money proper represents a floating claim on the issuer that is not linked to any particular account (White, 1997) . To the extent that the issuer is not a centra1 bank, there wil1 be a transfer of seigniorage from the centra1 bank to the private (financial) institution issuing e-money (Groeneveld and Visser, 1997; Berentsen, 1998) .* If e-money proper becomes so entrenched in the preferences of economie agents (for example, when it completely dominates altematives in terms of convenience and low tost; Rahn, 2000) , it could replace not only centra1 bank currency but also traditional bank demand deposits and other types of highly liquid deposits.' If this leads to a situation in which the claims that people exchange in order to execute transactions are no longer claims on the books of banks (or are no longer backed one for one by bank deposits), problems for the efficacy of monetary policy could arise as the connection between the change in reservable bank deposits and the change in non-financial activity wil1 be weakened (Gilbert, 1997) .
There are, however, (regulatory or institutional) ways to get around this problem. Examples include extending the reserve requirements to ah entities in the business of issuing these claims or requiring tax payments to be made using claims backed by bank deposits (Jordan and Stevens, 1997; Goodhart, 2000) .
The regulatory path seems to be favoured in Europe, see ECB (2OOOb), whereas the US seems to follow a more liberal attitude in this respect (Greenspan, 1997) .
6 Examples of e-transfers not belonging to e-purses include access products, such as debit cards, credit cards, ATM's. and home banking, in which payments are settled by way of transfers between bank accounts, and payment instruments as pre-paid telephone cards, which are accepted as payment only by their issuer. ' In addition, if ICT were to significantly reduce the demand for currency by the general public, the depository institutions' derived demand for vault cash would also diminish. For an analysis of vault cash, see Bennett and Peristiani (2001) . * Today, almost ah proposed e-money schemes are developed by private institutions. The issuer, however, could also be a centra1 bank. ' E-money is characterised by relatively high fixed costs, due to the need to rely on new technologies. but low marginal costs, as the tost of processing a single transaction is very small. This makes e-money especially suitable for making frequent and smal1 payments. Moreover, it is likely that there wil1 be a network effect. That is, once a critical mass is reached, a new payment instrument develops more quickly because its usefulness is an increasing function of the number of individuals who use it in executing transactions. Finally. the hkelihood of e-money becoming a substitute for bank deposits would increase were e-money to be remunerated.
However, the development of e-money proper is as yet mainly a theoretical concept" and not a practica1 reality (BIS, 1996a) . Moreover, it is unlikely that ICT wil1 have the potential to completely eliminate the demand for centra1 bank issued currency, owing, among other things, to the uniquely convenient features as a means of payment" of centra1 bank currency as wel1 as its status of being legal tender (Goodhart, 2CMN) . But even a significant reduction in the demand for centra1 bank issued currency might not necessarily pose a problem for the centra1 bank. First, it is wel1 known that it is not the size of the centra1 bank balance sheet that matters in this respect, see Tobin and Brainard (1963) . What matters is that changes in the size of the centra1 bank balance sheet, or the interest rate the centra1 bank can set, are at the margin related to changes in the volume and price of assets and liabilities that the public needs to engage in economie activity (Friedman, 2OOOa) . Since centra1 bank issued currency by convention (but not by necessity, see Goodhart, 1993) eams no interest, the issue thus is how closely the expansion or contraction of the remaining activities requiring centra1 bank currency matches the expansion or contraction of the overall economy that the centra1 bank seeks to influence." Second, central banks usually passively accomodate currency demand, in stead of trying to fix its supply (Ely, 1997; Freedman, 2000) . That is, as centra1 bank issued currency is probably not very relevant in monetary policy implementation, its demise, if this ever happens, is also unlikely to be important.
Currency is but one of the components of base money. We therefore now turn to a discussion of the effect of the new economy on the demand for centra1 bank deposits by depository institutions. These institutions hold an account balance with the centra1 bank mainly to satisfy reserve requirements and for use as settlement balances. Consider first reserve requirements. The introduction of the so-called sweep accounts in the US illustrates the relevante of the new economy, via the introduction of faster information processing, for central banks. It gives an impetus to innovations that facilitate the transfer of funds by depository institutions between their accounts not subject to reserve requirements and the balances that are, thereby allowing payments to be made while maintaining low average balances subject to the reserve requirements (White. 2000) . This type of behaviour can of course be countered by new regulation. However, the long-term success of the regulator in the ensuing regulatory rat race can be called into question when the regulations are not suffíciently market-oriented (Browne and Cronin. 1997) . For statutory reserve requirements that compel a depository institution to hold reserves it can not use or that pay subcompetitive interest rates act as an implicit tax, which innovators wil1 always have an " The proiiferation of various privately issued e-monies implies multiple media of exchange, stores of value, and, in incentive to circumvent. The notion that regulators can permanently swim against the tide of innovation is criticised by Friedman ( 1999) .r3 The worldwide trend towards the elimination of reserve requirements is also indicative in this respect.14 In addition to satisfying regulatory requirements, depository institutions also hold reserves at the centra1 bank in order to pay one another. That is, reserves function as a means of settling interbank transactions through the centra1 bank's clearing mechanism. This demand for central-bank settlement balances is mainly precautionary. Without uncertainty about payment transactions, a depository institution could plan perfectly ahead and always have the exact amount of reserves necessary. However, with uncertainty, a depository institution needs to minimise the risk of incurring a penalty over the market rate when unable to meet settlement obligations by the end of the day. This generally results in a positive demand for intraday reserves (Poole, 1968; Baltensperger, 1974) . By reducing this uncertainty, advances in information technology usually associated with new economy impact on the demand for settlement balances. More specifically, payments system innovations, both in gross and net clearing systems, have increased the efficiency and safety with which banks clear and settle interbank transactions, thereby potentially reducing the demand for intraday reserves (Henckel et al., 1999) .15
Moreover, another important factor related to the new economy, financial market liberalisation and deregulation, increases the liquidity of securities (BIS, 1998) providing depository institutions with an important substitute for centra1 bank reserves. Instead of holding settlement balances, banks hold liquid securities which they can use at any time to borrow the settlement balances that they exactly need to avoid end-ofday overdrafts in their current account at the centra1 bank.
Although these new economy factors work towards a reduction of the demand for settlement balances. it is likely that some residual demand wil1 continue to exist, due to, for example, strategie bank behaviour or other market imperfections.'6 Debtor banks may, for example, be unable to locate a potential lender in time or lenders may not offer loans at suitable conditions for strategie reasons. When the marginal creditor bank in the market must negotiate a price at which to lend resources to the marginal debtor bank. a game situation arises in which the creditor bank may be tempted to 'corner' the debtor bank (ie adopt non-cooperative behaviour). These arguments point to a reduced, but nonetheless positive, critical analysis. l3 Gilbert (1997) however seems to reach a different conclusion. l4 In most of the countries stil1 using them, the requirements no longer function as an instrument for monetary control.Their residual role in stead is their use as liquidity buffer. Note that in countries which completely abolished requirements, monetary policy stil1 remains effective (although operating procedures for policy implementation have changed). See Weiner (1996, 1997) . and Woodford (200).
l5 Gross settlement systems have the advantage of ensuring finality, whereas netting systems limit the need for settlement balances, for which a 'price' is paid in terms of settlement risk. Observance of the Lamfalussy standards (BIS, 1990), however, has considerably reduced this risk. On the other hand. sophisticated queueing algorithms, the provision of collateralised intraday liquidity by central banks and an efficient interbank market for central bank money have reduced the need for intraday liquidity in gross settlement systems. Thus, differences between gross and net s 2 sterns tend to diminish over time. It can be seen from economie history that. even before the nationalisation of clearing and the advent of reserve requirements, banks held positive reserves (White. 1989) demand for settlement balances, which are currently almost exclusively provided by the centra1 bank."
As in note issue, centra1 banks have taken on this role largely because private providers have been legally restricted or nationalised (White, 2000) . From an economie point of view, the main comparative advantage that centra1 banks currently hold over (potential) private competitors pertains to the fact that they provide settlement tïnality as a payment service (Issing, 2000) . That is, final settlement represents an ultimate, official guarantee of values exchanged by depository institutions and their customers (Jordan and Stevens, 1997) .18 However, there are no intrinsic reasons why final settlements could not be carried out by the private sector without the need for clearing through the centra1 bank." The practica1 implementation of such a system (a description of which is provided by, for example, Fell, 1994 and Cronin, 1997) would possibly require computers that communicate in real time to permit the instantaneous verification of the creditworthiness of counterparties, which presumably is beyond the computer power that is currently available (King, 1999) .
Moreover, the real-time transfer of wealth between electronic accounts needed to settle a transaction of goods or services would probably involve financial assets. Eligible assets would include any financial assets for which there are market-clearing prices in real time. This also requires formidable computing power (in addition to well-functioning and liberahsed financial markets). However, the factors identified in section 2 work into the direction of making al1 this available to more private parties at progressively lower tost. So, new economy induced competition can erode the centra1 bank monopoly in the market for settlement balances.
Centra1 bank control of short-term rates with substitutes for base money
The new economy thus could, in the limit, lead to a situation in which the demand for settlement balances is severely reduced, and the position of the centra1 bank in the market for settlement balances is next to completely marginalised. In combination with a diminished demand for centra1 bank currency, this could lead to a situation in which centra1 bank liabilities approach zero. Woodford (1998) has shown that in this 'cashless limit' (ie a situation in which there is some, possibly infinite small, demand for central bank reserves), the price leve1 is stil1 determined, and the centra1 bank is stil1 able to influence ovemight interest rates by changing its operational target. What is different, however, is that in such a world the use of quantity-targeting techniques (ie rationing bank reserves) to control interest rates (such as currently applied in the US) may become ineffective, especially when the residual demand becomes highly inelastic or unstable. It may have to be replaced by a more price-oriented system, see also " This central bank monopoly is complete in Europe, whereas in the US private clearing mechanisms exist, such as the CHIPS system of the New York Clearing House Association. " Note the rather paradoxical fact that the advent of privately issued electronic purses (which threaten central bank issued currency) for the time being strenghtens the central bank position in the market for settlement balances, as final net settlement of imbalances between these monies will be in the form of central bank liabilities. " Freedman (2000) . however, doubts whether the special role of central banks in providing settlement balances could ever be replaced, even in the absente of legal requirements for depository institutions to settle with the central bank.
His argument hinges on a priviliged relation between the central bank and the govemment.Whether this has consequences for central bank independente is an interesting topic for subsequent research. Friedman (2000a) . Under such a system the centra1 bank operates a borrowing facility at which an arbitrary quantity of reserves may be borrowed (subject to suitable collateral) at an announced rate.
Variations in this rate then is the tool by which desired variations in the operational target are achieved.
Beyond this limit lies a true 'moneyless' world" in which e-money proper perfectly substitutes centra1 bank issued currency, in which fmal settlement could be made without recourse to the centra1 bank, and in which there are no tost advantages for depository institutions to using central-bank settlement balances. Even in this economy, sometimes labelled as 'fully frictionless' (Woodford, 2000; McCallum. 2000; Bengtsson, 2OOOb) , the centra1 bank stil1 has the ability to influence the leve1 of the ovemight rate, as long as it is willing to change the interest rate that it pays on reserves." Although currently base money is not remunerated in the US, the remuneration of settlement balances is certainly not without precedent. In fact, a number of countries currently pay interest on balances that depository institutions hold at the centra1 bank, eg. Canada, New Zealand, Austraiia and the Eurosystem. Indeed, some of these countries already control short-term interest rates by varying the interest rate paid on balances held with the centra1 bank, rather than by injecting or absorbing liquidity in such an amount as to induce a desired differential between that interest rate and the ovemight rate. In a world in which there exist (perfect) substitutes for bank reserves, only a zero differential is compatible with a positive demand for base money, and conducting a monetary tightening by trying to increase the spread would result in a complete substitution away from reserves towards the higher-yielding privately issued liquid assets (Woodford, 2000) . Instead, the centra1 bank can steer short-tetm market rates in a direction it desires by bringing about changes in the interest rate paid on base money. That is, for a tightening the centra1 bank raises the nomina1 return on base money, which by virtue of arbitrage and the perfect substitutability characteristic also raises the nomina1 return on non-monetary assets to an extent that is consistent with price stability (Woodford, 2000; Hall, 1999) . As the choice of the nomina1 rate of interest on centra1 bank liabilities is an arbitrary choice of the central bank, this instrument is always available. The only requirement is that the liabilities of the centra1 bank are always accepted. Goodhart (2000) however makes the qualification that the changes in the rates paid on base money must be brought about by selling or buying existing centra1 bank assets. which wil1 imply a reduction of central bank profits (or an increase in losses). Effectively, central banks tighten by the selling of assets out of their portfolio at a lower price (higher return) than their competitors. and loosen by buying assets in exchange for base money at a higher asset price. He does not find this a major problem, because of the non-profítmaximising behaviour of the central bank as a public institution (see also Goodhart, 1985 Goodhart, , 1988 .
However, this could have consequences for the (financial) independente of the centra1 bank.
*' In 'conventional' monetary exchange systems the basis medium of exchange (commodity money or fiat money) invariably has served as the unit of account. In a moneyless world, there is no longer a tangible medium of exchange, and so the choice (and even the number) of the unit of account becomes less obvious, see Fama (1980 Fama ( , 1983 . " In such an economy, the demand for base money would, in the absente of remuneration of reserves, equal zero (Woodford, 2OOO) .Clearly, in the absente of demand, varying the supply (either by announcing a quantity or a willingness to supply at a certain interest rate) will be ineffective in influencing the ovemight rate.
So, even in an economy in which 'high-powered money' has lost its power, the centra1 bank wil1 be able to steer the ovemight rate. There remains however the question of the role to be played by centra1 banks in such a world described by, for example, Black (1970) , as the traditional functions of money wil1 be performed by an infinite number of altemative instruments, which can al1 be expressed in terms of each other (Fama, 1980; Goodhart, 1989) . In that world, monetary policy, that is the maintenance of a constant purchasing power of the unit of account, has no meaning because there wil1 be a number of units of account (Issing, 2000) . However, if society were to express a preferente for a particular unit of account, in which al1 altemative instruments would be priced, then it would stil1 be possible for the centra1 bank to regulate the value of this unit of account, as was discussed above.21 Note that in such a world the need to limit excessive money creation is replaced by a concern to ensure the integrity of the computer systems used for settlement. Centra1 banks could be seen as a natura1 candidate for such a supervisory activity.
It is very unlikely that this utopian world wil1 ever become reality. In any case, such a world would probably be preceded by an economy where centra1 banks face a reduced demand for settlement balances and competitors challenge the position of the centra1 bank in this market. It follows from the discussion above that in this situation, a centra1 bank can continue to influence the tost of flnance. It can do so by changing its instrument variable, either by choice of economie agents (by offering to lend/borrow unlimited amounts of its liabilities at a (risk adjusted) price which is by definition the most attractive) or by regulation. The latter could be realised by requiring taxes to be paid in centra1 bank liabilities (Friedrnan, 2OOOa, b ). An altemative would be to ensure that the centra1 bank remains the only entity which is allowed to corner the market for settlement balances by forcing participants to lend or borrow from its facilities at the rates it chooses to impose on the market. For a description of such a system, see Henckel et al. (1999) . By being the uncontested broker in the case of settlement diffculties, a centra1 bank acquires an unique disciplinating capacity which bolsters the credibility of its interest rate announcements and ensures that no private broker takes its place.
Thefinctioning of credit markets and the new economy
The leve1 of short-term market interest rates affects only a proportion of the financing of expenditure of households and farms. The private sector also finances part of its spending at longer-term rates on the capita1 market as wel1 as through fïnancial intermediaries (and through other means like retentions and equity issues). The tost of borrowing from these sources is only indirectly influenced by the current leve! of money market rates. Important determinants of the impact of changes in the instrument variable (the ovemight rate) on the tost of finance thus include the substitutability between different forms of fïnance.
the pass-through of changes in market interest rates to bank lending and deposit rates and the impact of " Such a preferente is likely, since an unique numeraire is an efficient solution to the co-ordination problems involved in negotiating contracts and performing economie calculations, see White (1984) and Issing (1999).
changes in short-term interest rates on long-term interest rates. These determinants wil1 likely be affected by the factors associated with the new economy.
The substitutability between different forms of finance and the responses to market rates of lending charges applied by financial institutions is to an important extent dependent on the functioning of credit markets. The new economy is believed to bring closer a neo-classical financial environment without frictions and asymmetrie information, that is, a world in which the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem holds. In this world, agents in the private sector can, at market interest rates, borrow and lend whatever amounts are necessary to achieve their desired spending pattems. The absente of information imperfections between suppliers and users of funds implies that the substitutability between intemal and extemal financing sources and between different forms of extemal finance, such as intermediated and non-intermediated credit, is perfect (BIS, 1994) . If bank assets and liabilities have identical characteristics to other borrowing and saving instruments. such as bonds, then bank and non-bank instruments wil1 trade at the same price (assuming risk neutrality). The pass-through from market interest rates to bank rates is immediate and complete (Dale and Haldane. 1993) . Financial prices in this perfect capita1 market allocate financial quantities optimally. Interactions between financial variables and nonfïnancial activity can be reduced and simplified to interactions between interest rates and non-financial activity. 23 The main implication would therefore be that, to the extent that information asymmetries and the crucial role of financial intermediaries wil1 be diminished by the new economy, there wil1 be an enhanced role for direct finance with a larger role of private debt securities and equity markets.= In such an environment, interest rate changes may impact on the corporate sector more quickly as fmancial market prices tend to react more quickly to changes in official rates than retail deposit and lending rates.
Thus. monetary policy actions may almost instantaneously affect corporate bond yields and equity prices. affecting the tost of direct borrowing, while the impact of official rates on lending rates is currently less immediate. Also, the more competitive fmancial markets, the greater the inclination of tïnancial intermediaries to adjust their interest rate spreads more promptly and significantly in response to changes in official rates (Mojon, 20) .
Nou-price component of tost offinance
However, since the seminal paper by Akerlof (1970) it is well-known that the efficient functioning of the market for credit is hindered by asymmetries in information between borrowers and lenders, resulting in principal-agent problems (Oliner and Rudebusch. 1996) . These problems lead to endogenous and varying credit conditions which help to shape the transmission of monetary policy decisions through the economy, see Stiglitz and Weiss (198 l) , Bemanke (1983) , Bemanke and Blinder (1988) . As recognised by, inter alia, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) . Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Hubbard (1994) this " As emphasized by Meltzer (1995 Meltzer ( . 2001 ). this equilibrium determines not a single interest rate, but a vector of rates, representing the yields on bonds, equity and other assets. The new economy, and the revolution in ICT in particular, increases the amount of information which is available to a greater number of economie agents at an increasingly lower tost. If the increased availability of information reduces the prevalente of information asymmetries, it also implies a reduced role of depository intermediaries in advancing credit to the non-financial economy, as their traditional comparative advantage, information intermediation. erodes. see Allen and Santomero (1998) . This disintermediation wil1 result in a further proliferation of nonbank credit (Friedman, 1999) . However, the extent to which the importante of the credit view of monetary transmission wil1 be eroded by the new economy remains an open question. As a genera1 remark, increased availabihty of information does not necessarily imply increased access to information.26 And the theoretical basis for the credit Channel, the theory of asymmetrie information (Akerlof, 1970) , stresses that these asymmetries arise because there exist economie agents who benefit from not disclosing their information to others (and that other agents know this). It is not likely that this behaviour wil1 change with new ICT (Browne and Cronin, 1997) .
However, even with a significant part of agents in the economy remaining 'bank dependent' because of continuing information asymmetries, the new economy could have an impact on the role played by fïnancial intermediaries in the transmission mechanism." To see this, note that innovations on financial markets have now advanced to the point where the bank that investigates the borrower's creditworthiness, originates the loan and services the credit relationship, no longer needs to hold the laan in its own portfolio. Instead, bank loans are often sold to (nonfïnancial) fïrms that package them into aggregated portfolios of similar credits, which in turn stand as collateral behind securities owned and traded by market investors, as wel1 as households who buy these securities directly on their own account.
New financial products such as derivatives are used by these agents (either directly or indirectly, via activities based on risk managemant skills using derivatives. '5 Note that, in addition to the effects described in a previous section, a declining importante of reserve requirements and open market operations wil1 also impact on the transmission mechanism by weakening the credit Channel. 26 See Herings and Schinkel (2000) for a more general discussion of the limitations to the diffusion of ICT. " Some also argue that the dominant mode of financial intermediation will change due to new economy-related developments (disintermediation and securitisation in particular).The traditional 'par-value' banking system, in which both the deposits and loans are redeemable at par. will in this view be replaced by a 'mutual fund banking'system. In the latter all assets and liabilities are traded on secondary markets and thereby carry varying values (Fama.1980 (Fama. , 1983 Goodhart, 1988; Browne and Fell. 1994 ). For a critical review, see Goodhart (1986 Goodhart ( , 1993 .
financial intermediaries) to manage the risks incurred by these investments. Securitisation weakens the influence of centra1 banks on the transmission process to the extent that it severs the bank-oriented component of the credit expansion from any direct relation to the centra1 bank's system of required reserves, see Thomton (1994) . Mishkin (1996) , Friedman (1999) and Estrella (2001) . The transfotmation of non-marketed bank loans into marketable securities thus reduces the role of the credit view even when bank dependency continues, see Chami et al. (1999) and Fender (2OOOa, b). D Edwards and Mishkin (1995) provide some empirical evidente of this weakening.
Term structure
The responses of longer-term interest rates to movements in short-term rates are easiest explained under the paradigm of perfect capita1 markets, as discussed above. If al1 financial assets (monetary or nonmonetary) are perfect substitutes, there exists only one relative asset price, 'the' interest rate. The differente between the short-term interest rate and the long-term interest rate, or, more generally, changes in market interest rates along the maturity spectrum, wil1 reflect fully the current leve1 and expected future path of short-term interest rates. This is the so-called expectations theory of the term structure (Modigliani and Shiller, 1973) , a theory that currently receives little empirical support (Berk, 2001 ). This should not come as a surprise, as capita1 markets are not perfect, fïnancial market participants are not risk-neutral and consequently the differences between interest rates of different maturity wil1 not only reflect expectations of future changes in short-term rates, but also risk premia. But to the extent that the factors usually identified with a new economy (section 2 above) work in the direction of a move towards perfect capita1 markets, and the pervasive possibilities for insuring and sharing risk using new financial instruments diminish the importante of risk premia (Shiller, 1993) , the expectations theory of the yield curve should fare better in a new economy. The latter should not taken to imply that risk premia wil1 disappear completely and immediately. However, the new economy wil1 tend to reduce and in the limit eliminate imperfections such as transaction costs, brokerage margins between borrowing and lending rates, restrictions on short sales, differential tax considerations, etc. In addition, the use of securitised claims for payments might also ease credit risks, as those claims would be marked-to-market on an ongoing basis and would be transferable in real time. The ensuing increase in portfolio diversification possibilities reduces price discrepancies between assets. Finally, it can not be excluded that the advent of derivatives in the management of risk by economie agents wil1 change their attitude towards risk, perhaps more into the direction of ra There seem however to be limits to the extent of securitisation, to the extent that certain assets, notably those which do not have a sufficient amount or quality of collateral, remain uncettain. This uncertainty in turn is a cause of the preferente for convertability into 'safe' base money. Proponents of the narrow banking movement (Fama, 1980) try to remedy this uncertainty, see Goodhart (1989 Goodhart ( , 1993 for details. Note that the advent of corporate risk management stratepies. making use of new financial products such as derivatives, tend to reduce the limits that are trsditionally placed on the proces of securitisation. See Goodhart (1989, p. 120-121) . For a further, and interesting, generalisation of implications of risk sharing, see Shiller (1993) .
risk neutrality, see Cape1 and Jansen (2001) . This al1 points towards an increased substitutability of assets across the maturity spectrum (Vrolijk, 1997) . The result would be a faster transmission of monetary policy signals along the yield curve.Moreover, by the leverage inherent in the use of derivatives this transmission would also be stronger.
The influence of changes in the tost of fïnance on non-financial activity
The impact of changes in the tost of finance (which includes quantity as wel1 as price-related variables) on non-financial activity depends on various factors (Bank of England, 1990) . First, changes in the tost of fïnance induce a substitution between saving and borrowing, as economie agents intertemporally smooth expenditure. Moreover, investment decisions are re-asessed in the light of changed costs of capital, as the latter affect the opportunity tost of real expenditure decisions. This substitution effect mainly influences new borrowing decisions. The direction of this effect is always negative, ie a rise in the tost of finance decreases non-financial activity, and the extent of the impact wil1 depend on the ability of agents to substitute intertemporally. Deregulation and globalisation of financial markets, improvements in ICT as wel1 as advances in risk management techniques and related instruments (derivatives), increasingly enable risks to be traded on financial markets and provide insurance. The new economy therefore improves the intertemporal substitution of income streams (Shiller, 1993) . This should work against the substitution effect of monetary transmission. It is, for example, possible to hedge against the adverse impact of the substitution effect: by using structured derivatives such as options on futures, a hedger can lock in the current interest rate for potential future funding needs. The new economy thereby pushes economies towards a more classical-looking world, in which expenditure decisions are determined to a larger extent by expected wealth and relative prices. In this frictionless world it is the real interest rate that matters, because economie agents wil1 typically base their decisions on a comparison between what they consume today and what they hope to consume in the future."
Moreover, current income (ie the fraction of wealth which is generated in the current period) should become less important a determinant of current consumption. Net worth would gradually replace cash flow as the primary influence on investment expenditures. There is some empirical evidente to support this position (see Browne and Fell, 1994 , for an overview), but it is stil1 far from conclusive whether the substitution effect of monetary transmisson wil1 become weaker. This is mainly because there will remain uncertainties which are not hedgeable. Moreover, hedging comes at a tost (through the option premium for example), which may prove to be prohibitive for some (especially small) economie agents.
Second, changes in the tost of finance lead to changes in average rates on outstanding contracts. modifying incomes and cash flows and hence constraints on spending. This income effect mainly impacts on outstanding borrowing. Its main influence is on agents' liquidity, and its direction depends on the net holdings of assets and liabilities. A net saver receives a positive income effect following an increase in the tost of fïnance, whereas a net borrower has a negative income effect. The rise thus redistributes income from borrowers to lenders. In practice, the standard life-cycle pattem of employment followed by retirement wil1 lead those obtaining income from labour to be, on balance, net savers. In contrast, the productive investing sector is by nature a net borrower, since it has to issue financial liabilities on itself to purchase the real assets which wil1 subsequently provide the returns to meet the debt obligations. If borrowers have a higher marginal propensity to consume than lenders, then the aggregate income effect is negative. As discussed above, the new economy provides increased insurance possibilities. This is particularly relevant for the income effect of monetary transmission, as derivatives significantly increase the ability of economie agents to hedge the income effect associated with fluctuations in the tost of finance. Hedged agents are either more sensitive to the tost of finance, or more risk averse than agents who end up holding risk. Hedgers could be willing to carry the tost of hedging because they have a higher marginal propensity to consume, and therefore wish to maintain their high consumption (Vrolijk, 1997) . Derivatives allow these agents to hedge their exposure to payments and receipts which are sensitive to the tost of finance. It can be argued that the size of the income effect wil1 be reduced due to new-economy induced increased insurance possibilities. Consider that for the duration of the hedge, the complete income effect has been shifted from the hedged agents to the risk holding agents. The hedged agents are not prone to an income effect, whereas the risk holders receive a double income effect. But since it is likely that the risk holders' propensity to consume is lower than that of the hedgers, the income effect is not as negative as if the hedgers had not been hedged. This line of reasoning demonstrates that, for every hedged unit, a risk holder must have acquired the risk, that is, hedging is (in a closed economy) a macroeconomic zero-sum game.30 There are thus always some economie agents which are confronted with an income effect. The actual change in the income effect element of the transmission mechanism lies in the differente between the marginal propensities to consume of the hedger and the risk holder. Moreover, and this also applies to the preceding analysis of the substitution effect, the new economy related factors also work in the direction of a faster transmission of monetary policy to asset prices (as their substitutability increases). This implies that (hedged as wel1 as unhedged) economie agents are impacted by a substitution and income effect sooner. That is, both effects may impact earlier, but are smaller in magnitude.
Third. changes in the tost of fínance affect the value of certain assets, such as housing, equities or govemment bonds. These values, in turn, have an impact on wealth perceptions. which influence spending (Bank of England, 1999) . Moreover, this so-called wealth effect influences the ability to borrow and the willingness to lend. As wealth is equal to discounted future net income, its effect in the chain of monetary transmission in principle is closely related to the income effect. There are two ways through which wealth can vary: through changes in income flows and through changes in the discount 3o However, to the extent that the new economy influences risk trading in such a way that risk ends up with economie agents and institutions most willing and able to bear risk, it improves efficiency. On the other hand, it also has the p,otential to shift the non-diversifiable risk in the economy to the imprudent (Buiter. 2000) .
Hedgers remove the need for precautionary saving, thereby increasing their propensity to consume. There is some.
factor. As the former effect is discussed above, we wil1 focus here on a change in net worth due to a change in prices, see also Mishkin (1996) . A reduction in prices of, for example, bonds, equity and real estate, causes a decline in wealth, which, according to the life cycle consumption model (Modigliani, 1971) , induces a reduction in non-financial activity. Again, hedging techniques similar to those used for hedging an adverse income effect, tend to reduce the size of the wealth effect. However, since hedging in order to maintain market value of assets currently is less common than using derivatives for earnings or cash flow management (Bodnar and Marston, 1996) , its size is probably smal1 relative to hedging against adverse income effects. This is in particular the case for changes in the price of real estate, for which the hedging possibilities are fairly limited, due to the relatively illiquid character of the market for real estate. Finally, to the extent that households and firms are likely to increase the share of securitised fmancial assets in their portfolios, the wealth effect may gain in importante.
A final factor through which changes in monetary policy instruments influence non-financial activity operates through the exchange rate (Menon, 1995) . Under flexible exchange rates, a higher tost of finance due to an interest rate increase attracts foreign capita], thereby appreciating the exchange rate.
The higher exchange rate makes domestic'goods relatively more expensive than foreign goods, decreasing net experts and (domestic) non-financial activity. Derivatives have the potential to significantly reduce the impact of this transmission Channel, to the extent that both wholesale importers and exporters use currency derivatives to hedge nomina1 exchange rate fluctuations in the short run.
Indeed, currency derivatives figure prominently in surveys of derivatives markets (Bodnar and Marston, 1996; BIS, 1996b) . However, changes in the tost of finance also induce changes in the real exchange rate, and these are more difficult to hedge, especially when the driving force behind the fluctuations are changes in the relative price level. In this case there is a substitution effect which is not insurable; agents are faced with the situation in which one country is relatively more reasonable for future investment or consumption flows. An altemative aspect of the exchange rate Channel is that of interest rate parity, which transmits domestic policy abroad, and foreign policy home. It can be argued that the arrival of large-scale over-the-counter currency markets increases the strength of the covered interest rate parity relationship. Moreover, through the link from derivative markets to spot markets, it wil1 ultimately strengthen the uncovered interest rate parity relationship (see in this respect Berk and Knot. 2001 ). The implication is an increased intemational interdependency of interest rates, and greater intemational capita1 flows following policy changes that change interest rates. Or, to put it differently, derivatives allow zero-risk arbitrage portfolios to be set up, forcing harmonisation of the relationship between exchange rates, foreign and domestic interest rates. Monetary policy inconsistent with domestic fundamentals or with foreign interest rates (or with the pegged exchange rate) will cause strong capita1 flows. Some of the counterparts of exchange rate derivative contracts. that is the agents who take over the risk from exporters or importers who want to insure themselves against exchange rate fluctuations.
wil1 be abroad. The total impact on domestic non-fïnancial activity of a change in the exchange rate albeit limited, empirical evidente supporting this (McCarthy, 1995) induced by a change in the tost of finance wil1 therefore be reduced, but the reverse also holds. That is, foreign monetary policy can affect the domestic economy through foreign risk held domestically.
To the extent that the new economy, via globalisation of trade, leads to an increased openness of an economy to trade in goods and services, the exchange rate Channel of monetary transmission wil1 increase in importante. This exchange rate Channel touches upon the broader aspect of the effect of the new economy on intemational interdependence of monetary transmission mechanisms. Rapid advances in ICT not only have brought many more investors into the intemational markets, but also have created a much greater degree of coherente in the attitudes and portfolio behaviour of investors who remain physically dispersed (Friedman, 1999) . As financial globalisation advances, more and more centra1 banks wil1 find that attempts to control their short-term interest rates in a policy vacuum, that is, without regard for intemational economie developments, wil1 not generate the desired domestic effects.
In sum, it is likely that in a new economie environment changes in the tost of finance wil1 affect non-financial activity sooner, but the total impact wil1 be less as more economie agents wil1 be able to isolate themselves from these changes. Moreover, the mechanism of monetary transmission wil1 be increasingly intemational.
The snlit between inflation and economie mowth
Our previous discussion showed that, because of real rigidities in the form of credit market imperfections, monetary policy can influence non-financial activity not (only) through interest rates but (also) through the availability of credit. In addition, the extent to which changes in non-financial activity generated by changes in the instrument variables translates into changes in prices and output, respectively, depends largely on the behaviour of wage and price setters. In general, the greater the degree of nomina1 wage and price flexibility, the more changes in non-financial activity affect prices and not output. Wage and price behaviour, in turn, is influenced by inflation expectations as wel1 as by institutional factors. The introduction of the rational expectations hypothesis (Muth, 1961) , to macroeconomics by Lucas (1972) . Sargent (1976) and Sargent and Wallace (1975) , led to expectational effects being explained in terms of concepts such as credibility and reputation of the policy maker. The institutional framework in which this interaction between the policy maker and the private sector takes place stresses factors which inhibit the continuous clearing of markets. Rational expectations are thus compatible with non-market clearing due to various (institutional) barriers to rapid adjustment of prices and wages (Fischer, 1977; Blinder, 1991; Bah and Mankiw, 1994) . The most notable explanations as regards the causes of these rigidities include legal and institutional barriers to price adjustments (such as rent controls) and monopolistic or oligopolistic competition in product markets (Gordon, 1990; Mankiw and Romer, 1991) . But also in a competitive environment, price inertia may result from the existente of menu costs in changing prices or from a desire by fïrms not to damage long-term relationships with clients by frequent variations in prices. As regards wage rigidities, explanations also focus on factors hindering competition, such as regulatory impediments to 18 ! , [ . . . wage adjustments (e.g. minimum wages), the influence of unions and generous unemployment benefit schemes.32 On the other hand, even where competition is fierce but information is distributed asymmetrically, there may be a desire of both firms and workers to have longer-term working relationships entailing an implicit insurance against excessive wage volatility, or firms may refrain from downward wage adjustments in order not to jeopardise employee motivation and labour productivity. Moreover, from the hysteresis literature (Cross, 19SS) , wage rigidities causing unemployment persistente are explained with insider-outsider and duration theories of the wage bargaining process.
It follows that the behaviour of markets wil1 be an important factor in determining how and with what speed a change in the tost of finance is spills over into economie growth (ie quantities) or inflation (prices), see in this respect also Cavelaars (2001) . In discussing the effects of the new economy on the functioning of markets, we wil1 mainly restrict ourselves to the availability and access to information.33 In that respect, a useful distinction can be made between goods information and information goods, see Hirschleifer and Riley (1995) . The former have no intrinsic value; they relate to information about products, and aim at (and derive their value from) improving the decisions made by economie agents.34 The conclusion that the more widespread use of ICT brings the economy more to the textbook model of perfect competition is mainly due to the likelihood of a more comprehensive and cheaper exchange of goods information, to such a extent that al1 the goods information ultimately becomes incorporated in the prices of goods. In general, the diffusion of ICT allows for a more efficient processing of information which (by reducing search costs) lowers transaction costs.
Moreover, by further enhancing an integrated approach in which information systems of various participants within the supply chain are interlinked (so-called connectivity), productivity growth is increased, see for example Meijers (2000) Sijben (2000) .35 This improves the functioning of markets in that agents are in a better position to tïnd a solution to the 'signal processing problem' (Lucas, 1977) . The latter relates to the issue of determining whether observed movements in prices reflect a shift in the genera1 price leve1 or in relative prices, and are permanent or transitory.36 The solution to this problem wil1 determine whether economie agents change their spending decisions, which wil1 in " For recent discussions of rigidities in the labour market, see Perry (1996, 2000) .
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Other factors that are likely to play a role in this respect, partly touched upon in previous sections, include financial market liberalisation and globalisation, and trade liberalisation, which can increase the degree of competition, productivity growth, and (by de-materialising output) reduce transportation costs. Moreover, more prudent fiscal policy has the potential to significantly reduce market distortions by containing crowding-out effects, and the succesful pursuit of price stability improves the working of the relative price mechanism, leading to more efficient resource allocation. 34 This of course does not imply that goods information cannot be traded in markets. as the real-life example of real estate agents shows. 35 More and cheaper access to information also improves the functioning of the labour market, by making the matching rocess P, more efficient and reducing frictional unemployment. The ensuing improvement in the co-ordinating capabilities of modem decentralised market economies is illustrated by the more optimal use of inventories. This, in turn, may help to dampen busines cycle fluctuations, see McConnell et al. (2000) turn determine whether real variables wil1 change.37 In an utopian new economy world with goods and goods information al1 information asymmetries wil1 be eliminated, and the Walrasian auctioneer wil1 determine equilibrium relative prices.38 In general, though, before this world becomes reality, fluctuations in the tost of finance wil1 elicit relatively quicker price adjustments, with less effect on quantities.39
Information goods (goods that can be represented in digital form) on the other hand are an end in themselves, ie they directly enter into production or utility functions. Examples of information goods used in production include word processors and databases, whereas consumers derive utility from information goods mainly from their entertainment value. The production and distribution of information goods are characterised by the public good properties of non-rivalness and nonexcludability (Arrow, 1962) . This implies that the advent of information goods in the economy is not a move towards the classica1 textbook model of perfect competition, in which an infinite number of smal1 price-taking entities compete. Instead, competition in this world is more akin to the Schumpeterian concept.40 Increased returns to scale on the supply side on the market for information goods tend to interact with network effects on the demand side to create powerful incentives for natura1 monopolies. This results in a market structure characterised by a smal1 number of large pricesetting entities. Profit maximisation by a traditional monopolist implies restricting supply and rising the price, leading to higher prices than in the conventional competitive paradigm. Monopolies in the market for information goods may however prove less harmful, as the pressure of technological change elicits a dynamism which wil1 ensure that there exists a rivalry between altemating or succeeding monopolies, ie contestability is always possible.4' The result wil1 be that firms operating in the market for information goods wil1 compete by lowering the price and increase output (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) .
If the weight of information goods in a new economie environment is relatively small, chances are that the economy will move towards the traditional classica1 paradigm, with the concomitant behaviour of markets and the consequences for the passthrough of changes in the tost of finance to prices and quantities (that is prices adjust quickly, with limited effects on quantities). If, on the other hand, this new economy wil1 be dominated by information goods, this wil1 imply a change in relative prices as resources are re-allocated towards these information goods. The general price leve1 should be 37 A purely transitory change in the relative price wil1 not elicit a change in behaviour, and nor will a change in the eneral 5 price level. See Lucas (1977) for a forma1 exposition. Supplemented by a fully frictionless financial world the general price leve1 would be meaningless, as would be monetary policy. However, if society were to express a preferente for a single unit of account, its value could be regulated by a central bank, and there wil1 exist an equilibrium leve1 of money prices (Woodford, 1998) . See section 4. 39 This wil1 lead to permanent effects on equilibrium price and output levels, with transistory effects on economie gowth and inflation. For similar arguments, see for example Herings and Schinkel (2000).
Note the interaction of the various forces associated with the new economy. In particular. the deepening and development of financial markets discussed above tends to improve especially the growth prospects of young, dynamic and innovative firms, that is the type of firms that contribute mostly to the waves of creative destruction. Schinkel (2000) . The key issue for competition policy in the new economy therefore is not market share, but the abuse of market power by a dominant fírm to discourage innovation by others.
4' In addition, the durable character of information goods will act as a catalyst for competition, see Herings and
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:.:, less affected, and wil1 continue to be determined by monetary factors, especially in the long run (Lucas, 1977) . The macro-economic effect of the advent of the new economy in terms of functioning of markets is therefore not clear-cut. The same applies for its effect on inflation and growth (Buiter, 2000) . Investigating the implications of phenomena often associated with the new economy, such as lower profit margins, a lower NAIRU, a higher trend productivity growth, on inflation and output, in the short as wel1 as in the longer run, requires the specification of a model. The theoretical basis for such a model is available, even for an economy dominated by information goods (see, for example, Meijers, 2000) . So, just as the new economy is, in fact, not new, its effects can and should be discussed using readily available, that is existing, economie theory.
Concludinp. remarks
The new economy is generally interpreted as a supply-side phenomenon, driven by technological advances and structural changes, which, partly via more flexible and efficient labour, product and capita1 markets and increased competition, over time lead to a higher leve1 and growth rate of potential output. Regarding the financial system, the new economy might also be associated with a tendency towards disintermediation, securitisation, the emergence of new fïnancial instruments and increased financial wealth.
We have discussed how monetary policy transmission would look like in this new economie environment. Our most genera1 conclusion is that monetary policy wil1 be possible. It seems unlikely that new economy-induced developments would ever severe1.y limit the possibility of centra1 banks steering the ovemight rate. Of course, methods for exercising this influence wil1 have to be adapted to the new economie environment. but that is nothing new for centra1 banks. As long as there remains some residual demand for base money, and there is every reason to expect that this wil1 be the case, these changes wil1 not have significant consequences. Even in the unlikely event that there are perfect substitutes for base money, the centra1 bank wil1 stil1 be able to steer interest rates. However, it wil1 probably require govemment backing, in the form of regulation that changes the structure of the fmancial system, or to financially support the centra1 bank. By steering its 'nucleus', the ovemight rate. the central bank is stil1 able to anchor the term structure, and this interest rate Channel of monetary transmission wil1 gain in importante in a new economy. The speed by which this anchoring occurs increases, as wil1 the speed at which changes in the tost of finance wil1 affect non-fïnancial activity.
The impact of the latter will, however, be less.
Although not directly addressed previously, we would also like to argue that there remains a need for monetary policy in a new economy. Stories about the 'death of inflation' (Browne and Fell. 1994 ) are not firmly based on economie arguments. Even in the unlikely case in which the new economy would closely resemble the perfect competition paradigm, this would mean a better functioning of the price mechanism. that is of relative prices. This suggests that monetary policy actions wil1 elicit primarily reactions in prices, with relatively less effects on quantities. Movements in the genera1 price leve1 wil1 stil1 occur, and there wil1 remain a need for an authority entrusted with maintaining the stability of this price level. Monetary policy as we currently understand wil1 be meaningless only in a utopian, fully frictionless, world because the latter has no genera1 price level.
However, it seems likely that even in this world there would be a single unit of account, the value of which can be regulated by a centra1 bank.
Our discussion points to a number of policy relevant questions that warrant future research.
The fust is to provide the qualitative analysis presented here with quantitative underpinnings, investigating the relative importante of the effects of the new economy on the various transmission channels. Secondly, having discussed how the new economy changes the way monetary policy affects the economy, the policy maker is confronted with the natura1 follow-up question, that is how to conduct monetary policy in a new economy. This touches on issues as the permanent or transitory character of accelerations in productivity or real output growth, and whether this is accompanied by a permanent or transitory decline in the inflation rate. Providing answers to these questions would require a rigorous modelling effort (see in this respect Buiter, 2000) and lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, our analysis suggests that caution is warranted in interpreting new economy effects on inflation rates and economie growth as permanent. The new economy will, in the end, imply a shift in and better signalling properties of relative prices. After completing this relative price adjustment, the equilibrium price leve1 wil1 probably be lower, but the persistente of the effects on the inflation rate are murky, at best. Confronted with the uncertainty that prevails surrounding these issues, another relevant question for policy makers would be whether to conduct policy in a gradual or more aggressive fashion, that is should the central bank follow a policy of interest rate smoothing or stepping?
In the end, the new economy is not new. and the same holds for the toolkit needed for analysing its implications, as wel1 as for the questions that confront the monetary policy maker operating in a new economie environment. The 'old' central banks therefore seem to have lost nothing of their relevante. 23 v.
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